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A NOT SO MODEL CODE
THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES AS A
NOT-SO-MODEL PENAL CODE
Gerard E. Lynch*
We are accustomed to thinking about the
criminal law, and the procedures for enforcing it, as
divided into two separate stages. The first stage-the
subject of penal codes and jury trials--concerns the
definition of culpable conduct and the adjudication of
guilt. The second stage-sentencing-concerns the
consequences of conviction for the offender. Only
rarely do we acknowledge that the conventional
separation of these stages into compartments is
highly misleading.
The articles in this Issue of FSR address, in one
way or another, the extent to which the concerns of
the substantive criminal law and the law of sentenc-
ing are in fact closely integrated. To a substantial
extent, the federal sentencing guidelines can be seen
as a continuation, from a very different philosophical
perspective, of the effort to reform the federal
criminal code. How successfully do the guidelines
accomplish this end?
I. THE MODEL PENAL CODE
We begin with a critical bit of history. In 1951,
the American Law Institute undertook the daunting
task of creating a model penal code. The MPC was an
effort to rationalize and codify the confusing mass of
common law, statutes embodying common law terms
or principles, and statutes enacted from time to time
to reform or supplement the common law. These
three sources made up the criminal law of most
American jurisdictions at that time.
But as Frank Remington reminds us in his article,
a critical issue faced early in the drafting process was
the degree of elaboration the code should contain.
Within broad categories of anti-social activity--
homicide, theft, sexual misconduct-traditional law
made numerous distinctions. Murder, for example,
was defined as a separate crime from manslaughter,
and was divided by most states into separate crimes
of first and second degree. How many of these
distinctions should be carried over into the new law?
In effect, the issue involved drawing the line
between the two stages of criminal law and proce-
dure. Professor Remington points out that the
framers of the MPC made a deliberate decision to
streamline the categories of offenses. Major levels of
culpability, defined in broad strokes, were formally
distinguished in the penal code, and recognized in
the labels attached to offenders. But most of the finer
gradations in culpability, it was agreed, did not need
to be reflected in the Code: they concerned only
*Professor of Law, Columbia University.
"treatment or penalty consequences." Consequently,
these distinctions were necessarily relegated to the
discretion of prosecutors and judges. The decision to
adopt a "simpler penal code ... rather than a more
elaborate one" represented a conscious choice for
discretion as against prescription with respect to
penalties.'
In opting for discretion over prescription, the
Model Penal Code reflected the prevailing sentencing
ideology of its time, embracingthe rehabilitationist
rhetoric and indeterminate sentencing regime that
dominated the first half of this century. The sentenc-
ing provisions of the MPC are directly influenced by
this choice. They adopt a highly indeterminate
sentencing regime, leaving very broad discretion to
the sentencing judge and to parole authorities, very
much a product of their time.
But as Professor Remington's historical research
makes clear, this approach did not merely influence
those MPC provisions that explicitly addressed
sentencing. Rather, the drafters' preference for broad
sentencing discretion affected the very structure of the
Code's highly-influential substantive definitions of
particular crimes. If it had been thought desirable to
control judicial discretion in sentencing more rigidly,
or to define more precisely the penalties attaching to
different kinds of acts, the decision to adopt a
"simpler penal code" with fewer categories of offense
would likely have been reversed. If matters going
only to "treatment or penalty consequences" were not
to be left to case-by-case judicial discretion, but were
believed capable of legislative determination on the
basis of general rules, the MPC's drafters would have
written many more "discriminations that have
ultimately treatment or penalty consequences"
directly into the Code itself.
Beginning in the mid-1960s, about two thirds of
the states revised their penal codes under the influ-
ence of the MPC. A massive effort to codify the
anarchic mass of federal criminal law along the same
lines, however, foundered on the political rocks of the
death penalty and the protection of classified infor-
mation.2 Bob Joost's article ably chronicles the failure
of this project. As he points out, comprehensive penal
code reform was in large part a victim of congres-
sional procedure. Complex and controversial
legislation can be blocked in too many power centers
in Congress, and different portions of the penal code
reform had too many enemies occupying too many of
those centers. Federal penal law remained
uncodified, unsystematic and illogical.
II. THE NEXT STEP
By the time the federal penal code reform effort
was pronounced dead, a new generation of reformers
had turned to sentencing as the next reform project.3
Influenced by Marvin Frankel's attack on the "law-
lessness" of sentencing discretion and disparity,4 by
despair over the apparent failure of the penal system
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to effect rehabilitation,5 and by a resurgent philo-
sophical defense of retribution and "just deserts"
sentencing,6 reformers concerned themselves less with
revising the substantive law of crimes, and more with
creating a determinate sentencing regime.
The sentencing reformers of the 1970s and 1980s,
however, failed to see that their project was continuous
with that of the MPC, and in significant ways inconsis-
tent with its approach. Instead, they appear to have
regarded penal code reform as a completed project-
the MPC is still taught in law schools as the culmina-
tion of modem thinking on substantive criminal law-
and to have seen their effort as limited to the separate
second stage of the proceedings: sentencing.
Like their predecessors, the new reformers
treated sentencing as a separate and discontinuous
stage of the justice system from the definition of
crimes or determination of guilt. The idea was to take
what judges did at sentencing-after guilt for
particular defined offenses had been determined-
and to rationalize it. Any implications for the penal
code were disregarded.
Federal criminal law in particular posed a further
challenge. Because of the failure of code reform, the
drafters of the federal sentencing guidelines did not
merely face the task of elaborating and refining the
broad categories of offense conduct proscribed in the
MPC and its state progeny. They were also faced
with the task of rationalizing the buzzing confusion of
the federal criminal "code," which by then had added
to the dense jungle of common-law distinctions and
traditional statutes any number of novel genetically-
engineered products of the mad legislator's labora-
tory-RICO, money laundering, carjacking, and a
host of jurisdictionally warped variants involving
mail, travel and the high seas.
As Bob Joost demonstrates, the resulting guide-
lines bear all the formal attributes of a penal code.
Splitting some offenses into what are in effect
multiple degrees (often following the general outlines
of the failed Brown Commission proposals), and
combining others under the same guideline provision,
the guidelines create, in effect, a simplified codifica-
tion of the behavior criminalized by federal law. By
rendering the offense of conviction ordinarily
insignificant for sentencing purposes, and replacing
the code offenses for these purposes with comprehen-
sive codified guidelines, the new federal sentencing
regime to a considerable extent rationalizes and
displaces congressionally-enacted criminal statutes.
III. ARE THE GUIDELINES A GOOD CODE?
Once the intimate connection between the
sentencing guidelines and penal code reform is
understood, two huge sets of questions emerge. One
set of questions, addressed in several of the articles
that follow, asks how well the Sentencing Commis-
sion, considered as a code drafter, has performed its
task. It is not surprising, perhaps, that the consensus
of our commentators appears to be, "Not too well."
Not perceiving its task for what, in large part, it was,
the Sentencing Commission seems not to have gone
back to the experience of the ALI, the Brown Com-
mission, and others who had puzzled over questions
of penal code reform to learn the lessons to be found
there. And so, as Judge Jack Weinstein and Fred
Bernstein point out in their article, the guidelines
significantly muddle questions of mens rea as applied
to factors that can have a dramatic effect on culpability.
To a much greater degree than any state penal
law, the guidelines have turned gradations of
culpability on rather crude quantifiable factors: the
common law's rich stratification of property offenses,
for example, is overwhelmed by the importance of
the sheer number of dollars stolen; narcotics offenses
are graded principally in terms of the quantity of
narcotics sold. Yet, unlike many state statutes that
make similar distinctions in defining degrees of
crime,7 the guidelines make a defendant's mental
state largely irrelevant to his level of punishment.
Professor Remington argues, more fundamentally,
that the entire enterprise is misguided, because the
MPC drafters were right in the first place to have left
these myriad distinctions of degree to discretion
rather than rule.
But even accepting the premise that guideline
sentencing of some sort is desirable, the existing
federal guidelines have weaknesses that stem directly
from their failure to address traditional concerns of
penal code drafters. Weinstein and Bernstein
document a principal problem: the lack of attention
to mens rea issues. As they point out, the guidelines
totally ignore the question of the level of culpability
required with respect to the quantities of narcotics
that determine the severity of sentencing in drug
cases. This has left courts free to take the extreme
position that neither knowledge nor even reasonable
foreseeability of the quantities being transported is
required in order to augment a drug courier's
sentence significantly."
It is not unprecedented for grading distinctions
in penal codes to be made based on strict liability
elements; even the Model Penal Code, despite its
general aversion to strict liability,9 contains some
grading distinctions that appear not to require
culpabilty.10 But it is difficult to imagine that
guideline drafters who understood their role to be
analogous to drafting a general penal code would have
failed to define culpability terms, and to make con-
scious decisions as to the kind of culpability required
with respect to aggravating circumstances that can
have a substantial effect on the degree of crime.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
My own primary concern, however, is with a
second set of questions, institutional and procedural
rather than substantive. If the Sentencing Reform Act
represents a reversal of the MPC's preference for
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discretion, that decision may be unwise, but it is
surely within Congress' power to make. The tension
between rule and discretion will always be with us,
and the balance point between their respective virtues
and vices will never be stable. The pendulum has
swung before, and it will swing again. But if Con-
gress wants a penal code that, unlike Wechsler's, opts
for elaboration and prescription over simplicity and
discretion, doesn't it have the obligation to write one,
rather than to farm out its work to an unelected
commission? And if crimes are to be divided into
more rather than fewer degrees, shouldn't defendants
have the traditional right to have a jury of their peers
decide the level of their guilt?
As both Bob Joost and Jim Felman point out, the
guidelines are no real substitute for an effective penal
code reform. While the guidelines render the offense
of conviction largely irrelevant for sentencing
purposes, Joost reminds us that prosecutors, judges
and juries nevertheless must still struggle with a host
of archaic and arcane distinctions among the con-
fused and overlapping statutes that the Brown
Commission was trying to eliminate, with significant
costs to efficiency and fairness. And as Felman
persuasively demonstrates, in some areas the
awkward fit between guideline simplification and
statutory overbreadth can cause remarkably unjust
results that would surely be avoided by judicial
discretion. Statutes such as those prohibiting money
laundering require substantive overhaul; the guide-
lines inadequately address the fact that the statutes
simply cover too broad a range of conduct. More-
over, by eliminating judicial sentencing discretion,
they compound the resulting injustices.
We live, as we all recognize, in an administrative
state, in which Congress does and must delegate all
manner of technical policymaking responsibility to
administrative agencies. But the distinctions being
written into law by the Sentencing Commission are
not technical matters of how many parts per million
of particulate matter are necessary to render the air
unfit to breathe. The substantive criminal law
concerns some of the most fundamental, and least
specialized, questions to be decided in any society,
and if it is deemed important to specify more
precisely the shades of society's condemnation of
different species of crime, is that not a matter for the
democratic process--for public legislation, rather
than anonymous regulation?
As Bob Joost reminds us, federal penal code
reform failed because the legislative process involved
too many procedural hurdles for a truly comprehen-
sive criminal code bill to pass. Yet the guidelines
(and their periodic amendments), which accomplish
as a practical matter an equally sweeping restructur-
ing of substantive criminal law, swept through
Congress without a vote, because under the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984 guidelines become law unless
Congress enacts legislation to veto them. The
Supreme Court, long since retired from any effort to
create an effective delegation doctrine, brushed off the
argument that the Constitution required more active
congressional involvement,1 but a delegation that is
constitutional is not necessarily responsible.
Perhaps this concern is naive: watching Con-
gress' biennial exercise in finger-painting a "compre-
hensive crime bill" to tout to their constituents does
not inspire one to stand firm for the principle that
these folks should play a larger role in sentencing
policy. But whether or not Congress would do a
better job, making federal criminal law is Congress'
job to do.
My second concern, however, is anything but
theoretical. By retaining a penal code built for broad
discretion while sponsoring the creation of a more
rigid and prescriptive code of sentencing, the guide-
line regime has pushed what are now perceived to be
critical issues of culpability into a second-string fact-
finding process. Accepting a rehabilitationist
sentencing policy, Professor Wechsler and his
colleagues necessarily relegated sentencing decisions
into a world of discretion and loose fact-finding. 2 But
if today's conventional wisdom rejects Wechsler's
approach, and seeks a "just deserts" prescriptive
penal code that draws more moral distinctions and
leaves less to social scientific guesswork, why mustn't
the jury-the traditional voice of the community for
passing moral judgment on citizens-decide, by the
conventional standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, the moral category into which a defendant
should be placed?
I do not mean to say that no fact relevant to
punishment can be found by a judge. A penal code
far more elaborate than the MPC could still leave
room for many even finer distinctions that might well
be left to less rigorous fact-finding. But as Felman
points out, the criminal code on which the guidelines
are superimposed leaves vast ranges of culpability
within a single offense, and vast ranges of treatment
alternatives to the sentencing authority. Absent the
rehabilitationist philosophy, the code would never
have looked like that. If that philosophy is to be
rejected, and a different set of rules created for the
sentencing stage, it should be recognized that this
change of policy has profound consequences for the
way the laws themselves should be written, and for
the procedural rules that implement those laws.
Failing to see these consequences, Congress has lazily
declined to rewrite its laws, and the courts have
blindly applied procedural precedents decided in a
different universe.
There is ground for hope that the Sentencing
Commission might begin to do a better job of penal
code drafting. Critical articles (like those of Joost,
Felman and Weinstein & Bernstein in this issue) will
point out practical or moral flaws in its structuring of
particular offenses; the commissioners themselves
will recognize the rigidity of some of their catego-
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ries;13 perhaps the Commission might even reconsider
the degree of discretion that can safely be allowed to
judges, and treat departures by concerned district
judges as useful advice rather than as signs of rebellion.
But I am more pessimistic about the procedural
and institutional issues. Congress has shown no
inclination to take penal code drafting seriously; its
only involvement in the process seems to be to
expand federal criminal jurisdiction, create unneces-
sarily duplicative crimes and double the odd penalty.
And far from recognizing that at least some types of
sentencing factors are too important to be left to
sentencing procedure, the federal courts seem
inclined to reduce even distinctions that are created
legislatively, and that affect not merely guideline
ranges but maximum and mandatory minimum
sentences, to mere "sentencing factors" that can be
decided by judges, on hearsay evidence, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard.'
Perhaps a growing recognition that the work of
the Sentencing Commission is more than just setting
guideposts for discretion, but in large part constitutes
the creation of a new federal criminal code, will force
more and more of us to ask whether it is wise, or even
constitutional, to take the most fundamental moral
ordering performed by law away from our most
democratic institutions-Congress and the jury.
FOOTNOTES
ISee the remarkably prescient dialogue between
Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael unearthed by
Professor Remington and discussed in his article.
2 See National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Law, Study Draft-Federal Criminal Code, and
associated workpapers (1970).
1 The federal penal code effort stands at the cusp of
the two phases of reform. As Bob Joost points out, the
Brown Commission had adopted the traditional sentencing
approach of the MPC. But by the time that bills incorporat-
ing its recommendations were actually introduced, they
incorporated proposals for sentencing guidelines. These
proposals, representing the dawn of a new phase of reform,
were the only part of the code bills eventually to become
law.
' Marvin Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without
Order (1972).
' Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and
Answers About Prison Reform, [Spring 19741 Public Interest
22 (1974), a powerfully influential article that answered its
title question with the simple reply, "Nothing."
6 See in particular, Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice:
The Choice of Punishments (1976).
7 See, e.g., People v. Ryan, 605 N.Y.S. 2d 253 (1993).
7 See United States v. DeVelasquez, 28 F.2d 2 (2d Cir.
1994), discussed in Weinstein & Bernstein, infra.
8 See MPC §§2.02(1), 2.02(3), 2.05.
9 See, e.g., §221.1(2) (burglary graded higher "if it is
perpetrated in the dwelling of another at night"; no
culpability apparently required with respect to whether the
building constitutes a dwelling or it is "night" within the
technical definition in the statute.)
1o United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
1" The locus classicus for the connection between
rehabilitationism, indeterminate sentencing and casual fact-
finding procedures is Williams v. New York. 337 U.S. 241
(1949). 2 The Commission has several times indicated some
dismay about its rules for classifying drug offenders, has
already introduced some greater flexibility into those rules
(see §2D1.1, application note 16), and may yet alter the basic
quantity-driven scheme.
"1 See, e.g., United States v. Cole, 32 F.3d 16 (2d Cir.
1994) (immigration offenses; aggravating factor interpreted
as sentencing factor rather than as creation of separate
degree of crime); United States v. Reyes, 13 F.3d 638 (2d Cir.
1994) (nature and amount of controlled substances not an
element of the offense of distribution); United States v. Monk,
15 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1994) (same rule as to possession offense
under 21 U.S.C. §844).
